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I. INTRODUCTION
Since the landmark 1973 Supreme Court decision Roe v. Wade,1 women in
America have had the right to choose an abortion to terminate an unwanted
pregnancy. This riht, however, has never been absolute and recent Supreme
Court decisions have allowed the most restrictive abortion laws enacted in
twenty years to stand as constitutional. Because of these decisions, several
antiabortion state legislatures have passed, and will pass, restrictive abortion
laws in the next five years. State courts will then have the occasion to decide
which regulations are constitutional. 2 While recent Supreme Court decisions
invite individual states to pass restrictive abortion laws, they also allow for
state courts to become more judicially active by carving more expansive
abortion rights for women out of their state constitutions. Thus, there is one
important question that arises as we near the dawn of a new century: will the
state courts protect a woman's right to choose an abortion?
This Note explores ways in which the states have and may in the future
control the abortion debate. Part II of this Note explains the background and
history of United States Supreme Court decisions on abortion. Part M analyzes
ways in which state courts interpret their own constitutions, differently than the
federal constitution, to protect more abortion rights. Finally, Part IV examines
how Ohio courts have interpreted the Ohio Constitution regarding abortion
rights. This Part will then draw from the analysis of state court decisions to
suggest ways that the Ohio Supreme Court could use the Ohio Constitution as a
source to protect broader abortion rights than are protected by the United States
Constitution.
1410 U.S. 113 (1973); see also infra subpart II.A.
2 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992); Webster v.
Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989); see Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588,
595 (Tenn. 1992) (stating that Webster "permitted the states additional leeway in regulating
abortion"); see also infra Part II for a discussion of regulations that the Supreme Court has
held valid in the abortion law context.
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II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE UNrrED STATES SUPREME COURT'S
DECISIONS REGARDING ABORTION
A. From Roe to Webster: The Evolution of the Court's Abortion
Jurispndence
In 1973, the Supreme Court decided its seminal abortion case Roe v.
Wade.3 The Court in Roe held that state laws criminalizing abortion without
regard to the particular stage of pregnancy or other government interests
violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.4 While there is
no explicit textual privacy provision in the Constitution, the Court found that
there are "zones of privacy." 5 It is within these "zones of privacy" that the
Court found a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy with an abortion.
The Roe Court held that the right of personal privacy includes the right to
make an abortion decision. 6 The privacy right is not, however, unqualified and
the court must weigh it against important state interests. 7 The Court
constructed a trimester framework to analyze the weight of various state
interests versus the woman's right to choose an abortion. The Court found that
a woman's privacy interest is most compelling in the first trimester of
pregnancy and during that time the state may not deny a woman's right to
choose an abortion. 8 The state has a compelling interest in the health of the
pregnant woman at the end of the first trimester. 9 At this stage-the second
trimester-the state may regulate the abortion procedure in ways that are
"reasonably related to maternal health." 10 The state's interest in the potential
life becomes compelling at the point of viability.11 At this stage the state may
3 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
4 Id. at 147-64.
5 Id. at 152-53. The Fourteenth Amendment provides in pertinent part: "[N]or shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ...
U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
6 Roe, 410 U.S. at 153-54. The United States Constitution does not contain any
explicit textual language protecting a person's right of privacy. The Court instead looked to
the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, to find that there are "zones of privacy"
surrounding this provision of the Constitution. See supra note 5. It is within these "zones"
that the right to privacy exists. It is from these "zones of privacy" that a woman gains a
right to choose an abortion to terminate a pregnancy.
7 Roe, 410 U.S. at 154.
8 Id. at 162-64.
9 Id. at 163.
10 Id. at 163-64.
11 Id. at 163.
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regulate or even proscribe abortions except when an abortion is necessary to
preserve the life or health of the mother. 12
While some commentators have criticized the Supreme Court's decision in
Roe, 13 it has remained the law of the land14 for some twenty years. The Court
recently reaffirmed the essential holding of Roe in Planned Parenthood v.
Casey,15 and the basic right of a woman to choose an abortion is still grounded
in our nation's constitutional framework.
The Court has taken many opportunities since its Roe decision to revisit the
abortion question. This has resulted in many modifications and permutations of
the right recognized in Roe. Most of the Supreme Court's decisions dealing
with abortion concern the issue of whether certain regulations, imposed by the
states on the right to choose an abortion, are constitutional. Between 1973 and
1989, the Court generally presumed statutes regulating abortion to be invalid
and consequently struck down most abortion restrictions. 16 To overcome this
presumption, the state was required to prove that it had a compelling reason for
adopting the regulation at issue.
The first abortion case after Roe, Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,17 dealt
with a state regulation that allowed the father of an unborn to veto a woman's
choice to abort. The statute also allowed the parents of a pregnant minor
absolute veto power over her right to choose an abortion.' 8 The Court ruled as
unconstitutional any law allowing a man to have veto power over a woman's
12 Id. at 163-64.
13 See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some 7houghts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to
Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. Rnv. 375 (1985) (stating that less controversy may have
surrounded the Supreme Court's premier abortion decision if the Court had tied the right to
sexual equality and equal protection instead of due process); Michael J. Perry, Why the
Supreme Court Was Plainly Wrong in the Hyde Amendment Case: A Brief Comment on
Harris v. McRae, 32 STAN. L. REv. 1113, 1114 (1980); Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the
Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection,
44 STAN. L. REV. 261 (1992); see also LAURENCE H. TRBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF
ABSOLUTES (1990).
14 Roe has remained the law but with some large modifications. See infra notes 17-78
and accompanying text for a detailed discussion of Roe's progeny.
15 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). See infra notes 56-78 and accompanying text for a more
detailed discussion of Casey.
16 See TRIBE, supra note 13, at 15-16.
17 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
18 Id. at 58.
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abortion decision. 19 The Court also held that a state may not give the parents of
a minor child ultimate veto power over her decision. 20
In City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc.,21 the
Court held that if a state requires parental consent before performance of an
abortion, the state must also allow for a judicial bypass. 22 Under this approach,
a judge decides if a minor is mature enough to make the abortion decision on
her own.3
In Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists24
the Court struck down laws requiring the physician to give the woman
descriptions about fetal development, informing her of the physical and
psychological risks associated with abortion, and reminding her of remedies
available for getting financial aid from the father should she choose to give
birth.25 In 7hornburgh, as in the precedents following Roe, the Court used a
strict scrutiny test requiring that any regulation of abortion must be narrowly
tailored to further a compelling state interest.26 The Court found that the
requirement to give women seeking an abortion specific information was
designed to dissuade women and imposed a rigid requirement irrespective of a
particular woman's needs.27
While most of the Court's decisions invalidated states' attempts to regulate
the abortion decision, there is one notable exception. The Court has upheld
federal and state restrictions on public funding of abortions and abortion
19 Id. at 67-72. This result has been affirmed by Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112
S. Ct. 2791 (1992).20 Danforth, 428 U.S. at 72-75.
21 462 U.S. 416 (1983) [hereinafter Akron I], overruled by Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
22 Akron 1, 462 U.S. at 439-40. In Akron I, the Court determined the constitutionality
of a regulation that would prohibit a physician from performing an abortion on a pregnant
minor under age 15 unless she obtained informed, written consent of a parent or an order
from a court with jurisdiction over the minor.
23 Id. at 441.
24 476 U.S. 747 (1986), overruled by Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791
(1992); see infra notes 56-78 and accompanying text.
25Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 759-65. The Court said, "The States are not free, under
the guise of protecting maternal health or potential life, to intimidate women into continuing
pregnancies." Id. at 759. But see Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992)
(upholding a very similar Pennsylvania statute).
26 7hornburgh, 476 U.S. at 765-68.
27 Id. at 762. The Court was persuaded that the Pennsylvania statute in question in
Thornburgh was an attempt by the state to control a woman's abortion decision and stated
that the requirement that the physician give the woman certain materials was "an outright
attempt to wedge the Commonwealth's message discouraging abortion into the privacy of
the informed-consent dialogue between the woman and her physician." Id.
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facilities. 28 Three cases came before the Supreme Court in 1977 that dealt with
the issue of public funding for abortions and abortion services. 29 In the first
case, Beal v. Doe,30 the Court upheld the right of a state to have discretion
whether to fund or not fund nontherapeutic abortions.31 The Court held in
Maher v. Roe32 that a state may refuse to fund nontherapeutic abortions even
though the state may choose to fund an indigent woman's childbirth
expenses. 33 In Poelker v. Doe,34 the Court held that states and cities could
choose not to provide public employees or facilities to perform nontherapeutic
abortions. 35 In 1980, the Court decided Harris v. McRae,36 in which it
extended its analysis in Maher to the federal government. The Harris Court
found the Hyde Amendment,37 a restriction on the use of federal Medicaid
funds for abortion, to be constitutional.38 These decisions dealing with funding
of abortions and abortion services are notable exceptions to the Court's early
presumption against the validity of state regulations of abortion.
In 1989, the Supreme Court's decisions diverged onto a new path of
upholding state restrictions on abortion. It has been suggested that this
divergence was the result of Reagan's appointment of three conservative
antiabortion justices during his eight-year term as President, replacing three
28 At least one constitutional scholar has argued that, "The public funding of abortion
decisions appear incongruous following so soon after the intrepid 1973 rulings. The Court
did not adequately explain why the 'fundamental' choice principle and trimester approach
embraced in Roe did not bar the sovereign, at least at the previability stage of pregnancy,
from taking sides." Ginsburg, supra note 13, at 386.
29 See Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977);
Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977). These cases are discussed infra notes 30-35 and
accompanying text.
30 432 U.S. 438 (1977) (holding that a regulation that limited funding of abortions by
Pennsylvania's Medicaid program to those abortions that the state considered "medically
necessary" is consistent with the Social Security Act).
31 Id. at 443-45. "Nontherapeutic" abortions are those abortions that are elective and
are not necessary to save the life or health of the pregnant woman.
32 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
33 Id. at 474 (holding that the government may make a value judgment favoring
childbirth over abortion and implement that judgment by the allocation of public funds).
34 432 U.S. 519 (1977).
35 Id. at 521.
36 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
37 Act of Nov. 20, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-123, § 109, 93 Stat. 923, 926 (1979).
38 Harris, 448 U.S. at 312-17. The Court stated that the government merely, "by
means of unequal subsidization of abortion and other medical services, encourages
alternative activity deemed in the public interest." Id. at 315.
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Justices who were in the Roe majority. 39 This fundamental change in the
makeup of the Court led to Webster v. Reproductive Health Services.40
Webster was a challenge to a Missouri state statute placing restrictions on
performing abortions in public institutions even if the woman paid her own
bill.41 The preamble of the statute read, "[tihe life of each human being begins
at conception." 42 The law also required physicians to complete fetal viability
tests when the woman was twenty weeks or more pregnant.43
In Webster the newly shaped Court was asked to decide the fate of Roe v.
Wade.44 A splintered Court upheld Roe, but the plurality also upheld the
restrictions on the use of public employees and facilities for the performance of
nontherapeutic abortions. 45 Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for himself and
Justices White and Kennedy, concluded that the government has an interest in
protecting potential life throughout pregnancy, not just at viability.46 The
plurality upheld the statute on the grounds that the right to terminate a
pregnancy was merely a liberty interest-like driving a car or working-which
merits no special governmental protection. 47 This change was significant, for
before Webster, the right to choose an abortion was seen as fundamental-like
the right to assemble, speak freely, or be secure in one's home.48 A four-
Justice dissent insisted that the right to end pregnancy was fundamental. 49
Justice O'Connor became, for the first time in the abortion context, the
"swing vote." She voted to affirm Roe but also voted to uphold the statute at
issue. Justice O'Connor advocated her "undue burden" test, her own preferred
test for scrutinizing abortion regulations. She concluded that the statute at issue
should be upheld because it imposed no undue burden on a woman's right to
choose an abortion.50 While there was some debate after Webster about
whether it actually changed abortion law, one constitutional scholar concluded,
3 9 TRIBE, supra note 13, at 15-16.
40 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
41 Id. at 501.
42Id.
43 Id.
44 TRIBE, supra note 13, at 20-21. An amazing 78 amicus briefs were filed in Webster,
a record number at the time. Id. at 21.
45 Webster, 492 U.S. at 507-11.
46 Id. at 517-20.
47 Id. at 507-11; see also TRIBE, supra note 13, at 23.
48 TRIBE, supra note 13, at 23.
49 Webster, 492 U.S. at 539-41; see also TaIE, supra note 13, at 23.
50 Webster, 492 U.S. at 530-3 1. See infra subpart JI.B. for a more thorough discussion
of the undue burden test.
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"if constitutional law is as constitutional law does, then after Webster, Roe is
not what it once was." 51
Since the Webster decision, the Court decided Rust v. Sullivan,52 a case
that pitted the medical establishment against the legal establishment. Rust
involved a challenge of a federal rule, known as the "gag rule," which
prohibited Title X fund recipients from providing patients with information,
counseling, or referrals about abortion. 53 Because the law regulated how and
what clinic counselors could tell a patient, it was labeled a "gag rule." The
Court upheld the regulations and cited Maher54 for the proposition that
government may make a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion and
implement this judgment by allocation of public funds.
Two days into his presidency, President Clinton directed the Secretary of
the Department of Health and Human Services to suspend the gag rule and to
promulgate new rules affecting Title X fund recipients. 55 This effectively
renders the Supreme Court's opinion in Rust moot insofar as it affects the gag
rule. Though the lifting of the gag rule is a victory for the pro choice
movement, the Supreme Court's latest decisions leave a long road of litigation
ahead for both sides of the abortion debate.
B. Analysis of Planned Parenthood v. Casey
Following the Webster decision and the affirmance of the gag rule in
Rust,5 6 tensions mounted as antiabortion activists pressed the Court to overturn
Roe. Similarly, abortion rights advocates pressed the Court to reaffirm Roe.
Additionally, the Webster decision-while creating panic for abortion rights
advocates who saw state legislatures furiously passing restrictive legislation-
provided little guidance to courts seeking to define the boundaries of abortion
5 1 TRIBE, supra note 13, at 24.
52 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991).
53 See Public Health Services Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300a-6 (1992). This Act provides
federal funds for family planning clinics to provide services for low-income patients.
54 Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); see also supra notes 31-36 and accompanying
text.
55 Text of President Cinton's Memos to the Secretary of Health and Human Services
and the Secretary of Defense Concerning Abortion Rights, The Reuter Transcript Report,
Jan. 22, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Currt File. Besides lifting the gag rule,
President Clinton also reversed bans on fetal tissue research and directed the Secretary of
Defense to lift the ban on all abortions in United States military facilities abroad, allowing
abortion services when paid for entirely with non-Department of Defense funds. See
Katherine Boo, The Clinton Evolution; The Kvetching of Critics Misses His Real Domestic
Achievenents, WASH. PosT, June 20, 1993, at C1.
56 For a discussion of Webster and Rust, see supra subpart II.A.
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rights. 57 With the 1992 case Planned Parenthood v. Casey,58 the Court had the
opportunity to decide the fate of Roe and to more clearly delineate the
constitutional bounds of the abortion right.
The Court in Casey accomplished three things. First, it unequivocally
reaffirmed the "essential holding" of Roe.59 Second, the Court rejected the
trimester framework adopted in Roe and instead made viability the crucial point
of judicial inquiry.60 Third, the Court adopted the "undue burden" test for
deciding the constitutionality of state regulations of abortion.61
The "essential holding" of Roe, as defined by Justice O'Connor in the joint
opinion, has three parts. First, a woman has a right to choose an abortion
before viability and to obtain it without undue interference from the state.62
Second, the state has the power to restrict abortion after fetal viability if the law
provides exceptions for pregnancies that endanger a woman's life or health. 63
Third, the state has legitimate interests from the outset of the pregnancy in
protecting the health of the pregnant woman and the potential life.64
Perhaps the most striking aspect of the Casey joint opinion is that it creates
a new form of stare decisis. Justice O'Connor's opinion ostensibly plays slave
to stare decisis to uphold the "essential holding" of Roe while simultaneously
overruling two post-Roe decisions. 65 Without overruling the decisions of Akron
I and Thornburgh,66 the Court would have had to invalidate Pennsylvania's
informed consent, waiting-period, and record-keeping requirements. 67 The
three-Justice joint opinion created a strange brand of stare decisis to
accommodate both the reaffirmance of Roe and the new standard of review-
the undue burden test.
57 See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 601 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, sub nom.
Stowe v. Davis, 113 S. Ct. 1259 (1993).
58 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
59 Id. at 2804. The vote for the reaffirmance was 5-4.
60 Id. at 2817-18. "Viability" is defined as the point at which the fetus presumably has
the capability of meaningful life outside the woman's womb. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 163 (1973). Viability at the time of Roe was at approximately 28 weeks of pregnancy
while at the time of Casey it was approximately 23 to 24 weeks. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2811.
61 Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2819.
62 Id. at 2804.
63 Id.
6 4 Id.
65 The Court overruled the holdings of Akron I, 462 U.S. 416 (1983) and Thornburgh
v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986). See supra
subpart ll.A.
66 See supra notes 21-27 and accompanying text for a discussion of these cases.
67 See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2816-17, 2822-26 (1992)
(opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, JL).
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The undue burden test has been endorsed by Justice O'Connor since
1983.68 In Casey, Justice O'Connor rejected the trimester framework as too
"rigid" 69 and because it "undervalues the State's interest in potential life." 70
Under the undue burden test, abortion regulations before fetal viability are
scrutinized for the amount of hardship they impose. Those restrictions of
abortion that are "substantial obstacles" are struck down.71 Burdens that are
less than "substantial" are upheld if they are minimally rational. 72
Though one might agree with the joint opinion that the trimester
framework was too "rigid," the undue burden test may prove too elusive and
unworkable. The Casey Court certainly did not provide more clearly defined
boundaries of the abortion right. It is probable that with such a "fuzzy"
standard as "undue burden," lower federal and state courts will see more
abortion litigation-not less73-as states pass restrictive abortion laws that they
hope will not be found to present an "undue burden." State courts will have to
struggle with what exactly is an "undue burden." 74 Justice O'Connor herself
identified the elusive nature of the new standard when she noted that, while the
regulations in Casey were upheld, the decision was limited to the record before
the Court and future evidence may show the same restrictions to be undue
burdens. 75
68 See Akron 1, 462 U.S. at 453, 461-66 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
69 Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2818.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 2820.
72 Id. at 2820-22 (stating that state measures designed to persuade women to choose
childbirth over abortion would be upheld if reasonably related to that goal).
73 See Tamar Lewin, The Supreme Court: Clinics Eager to Learn Impact of Abortion
Ruling, N.Y. TIMEs, July 1, 1992, at Al (discussing effects of the Casey decision on clinics
and quoting Janet Benshoof, president of the Center of Reproductive Law and Policy, as
saying, "When push comes to shove, we're left with a legal standard I can't figure out. It
looks like we're going to have to relitigate every restriction [that's been struck down].").
74 One month after the Casey decision the Oklahoma Supreme Court, in In re Initiative
Petition No. 349 State Question No. 642, 838 P.2d 1 (Okla. 1992), cert. denied, Oklahoma
Coalition to Restrict Abortion, Inc. v. Feldman, 113 S. Ct. 1028 (1993), was asked to
determine the validity of Initiative Petition No. 349. Initiative Petition No. 349 would
criminalize abortion except in these four circumstances: (1) grave impairment of the
woman's physical or mental health; (2) rape (as defined in OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1111
(1991)); (3) incest (as defined in OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 885 (1991)); and (4) grave physical
or mental defect of the fetus. Instead of tackling the undue burden test, the court found the
initiative petition unconstitutional on its face by not allowing a woman to make a private
abortion decision at any time during pregnancy.
75 Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2825-26.
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Neither side in the abortion debate found much solace in the Casey
decision.76 For pro choice advocates, Casey rendered Roe a shell of its former
self. Antiabortionists felt betrayed by conservative appointees who did not join
to overrule Roe.77 The Casey decision was not a clear victory or defeat for
either side of the abortion debate but a compromise-like the Roe decision-
only granting more power to the state in favor of coercion. 78
C. The Freedom of Choice Act
While the United States Constitution protects the right to terminate a
pregnancy with an abortion, the right still seems tied to the whims and
fluctuations of the high Court. 79 With the first Democratic leadership in the
country in twelve years, the Clinton administration will have the opportunity to
appoint pro choice Justices committed to maintaining the essential Roe right.80
The Democratic-dominated Congress, however, has its own opportunity to
make its mark on abortion law by passing the "Freedom of Choice Act." 81
The purpose of the Freedom of Choice Act is to protect the reproductive
rights of women. The Congressional findings state that the Court no longer
uses the strict scrutiny standard as enunciated in Roe and this has allowed states
to unduly restrict a woman's right to choose an abortion. 82 The Act would
prohibit a state from restricting a woman's right to end a pregnancy before fetal
viability83 or at any time if necessary to protect the woman's life or health. 84
The Act thus seeks to preserve the core of rights established in Roe while still
allowing a state to require parental consent with some kind of bypass
76 See Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court 1991 Term-Foreword: The Justices
of Rules and Standards, 106 HARv. L. REv. 22, 33 (1992).
77 Id.
78 Id. at 34.
79 For an eloquent and passionate portrayal of the dramatic effect one vote could have
on this liberty interest, see Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2854-55 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring
in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
80 President Clinton has, in fact, appointed Ruth Bader Ginsburg to the Supreme
Court. Justice Ginsburg, in her confirmation hearing, unequivocally stated that she believes
that a woman has a constitutional right to control her own reproduction. Justice Ginsburg
has in the past, however, criticized Roe as sweeping too far and mobilizing the right-to-life
movement and reaction in Congress and state legislatures. She has also criticized the
decision because it narrowly defined the issue as between the fetus' interests and a woman's
interests. See Ginsburg, supra note 13.
81 Freedom of Choice Act of 1993, S. 25, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
82 Id. § 2(a)(1)-(2).
83 Id. § 3(a)(1).
84 Id. § 3(a)(2).
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procedure, 85 to deny state funds to pay for the procedure, 86 and to protect a
person conscientiously opposed to abortion from having to participate in
performance of abortions.87
While the Act would allow states to refuse to pay for abortions for
Medicaid recipients, it would also permit many state restrictions such as
waiting periods, record-keeping requirements, and gag orders. Pro choice
political activists support passage of the bill as a safeguard against the one-
person vote needed to overturn Roe.88 Because the future of the bill and of the
makeup of the Supreme Court is uncertain, pro choice activists and litigators
should look to the state legislatures and state court systems to protect the
abortion right.
]II. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL MODELS FOR PROTECTION OF A WOMAN'S
RIGHT TO PRIVACY
Under the precedent of recent Supreme Court opinions, state regulations of
abortion will be upheld as long as they do not impose an "undue burden." 89
These decisions have renewed the zeal of antiabortion lobbyists and state
legislators as they attempt to pass restrictive abortion legislation in the states. 90
Because it is unclear exactly what restriction would constitute an undue
85 Id. § 3(b)(3).
86 Id. § 3(b)(2).
87 Id. § 3(b)(1).
88 See Rorie Sherman, Shaping the Abortion Debate: 77e War to Heat Up, NAT'L L.J.
Nov. 30, 1992, at 1 ("[O]nly an act of Congress can stop the expected flood of state
abortion-regulation bills. Pro-abortion rights lawyers... are now hopeful that the Freedom
of Choice Act will pass.").
89 See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2819 (1992); Ohio v. Akron
Center for Reproductive Health, 497 U.S. 502 (1990) [hereinafter Akron ]" (opinion of
Kennedy, I.); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 458-59 (1990) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment in part); Webster v. Reproductive Health
Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 530 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment). For a more detailed explanation of the undue burden test, see supra subpart lI.B.
90 See Lewin, supra note 73, at Al (quoting Burke Balch, state legislative director for
the National Right to Life Committee, as saying that antiabortion groups in many states will
seek passage of laws similar to the one upheld in Casey). The states most likely to pass laws
restricting or prohibiting abortion rights are Alabama, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi,
Missouri, Nebraska, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, West
Virginia, and Wisconsin. State-By-State Look at Abortion, The Gannet News Service, Apr.
3, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Gns File.
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burden,91 antiabortion state legislatures will experiment with laws that stop
short of completely banning abortion.
A state court may use one of three possible constitutional constructions to
provide more protection of privacy rights than under the federal constitution. 92
First, the court can find that the state constitution contains an explicit textual
privacy provision not found in the federal constitution. 93 Similarly, the court
may find that the state constitution contains a provision with no analogy in the
federal constitution. Second, the court may find that the language of a
particular provision of the state constitution is broader and therefore more
protective of individual privacy rights than the language of its federal
counterpart. Third, the state may find that although the state constitution's
language is substantially identical to the United States Constitution, the state
has a history of interpreting analogous provisions more broadly than does the
United States Supreme Court. Although each of these methods is explored
individually below, courts often employ these methods in tandem to reach a
decision that a state constitution is more protective of individual rights than the
federal constitution.
State courts will hear many cases that deal with these restrictive abortion
laws over the next several years. While the state courts could wrestle with the
undue burden test, some states have and will continue to create their own
constitutional doctrine based on their own state constitutions. 94 Some state
courts may seize upon the opportunity given them by Webster and Casey to
recapture broader fundamental rights for their own people 95 than are protected
91 See supra notes 68-78 and accompanying text.
92 It has been suggested that, in general, state courts use three principal modes of state
constitutional analysis. In the "lock-step" approach, state courts follow the letter of Supreme
Court decisions when interpreting parallel state constitutional provisions. The "reactive
posture" refers to a state court generally following federal precedent but granting more
rights under its own constitution in certain isolated cases. In the "beyond-the-reactive"
approach, state courts undertake an independent state constitutional analysis. Kimberley A.
Chaput, Abortion Rights Under State Constitutions: Fighting the Abortion War in the State
Couts, 70 OR. L. REv. 593, 607 (1991). The approach asserted in this Note was developed
from a study of how state courts deal specifically with abortion issues. Thus, the more
general framework outlined above will not be discussed.
93 See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text for an explanation of the foundation for
a federal constitutional right to privacy.
94 A decision by a state supreme court which diverges from United States Supreme
Court precedent on a subject must be supported by "adequate" and "independent" state
constitutional grounds if it is to withstand challenge. See PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v.
Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
95 See William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977). Justice Brennan persuasively argues that "state
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by the federal constitution. What follows is a brief survey of how several states
have interpreted their own state constitutions in the context of abortion rights.
This Note will then conclude with an application of this survey of state
constitutional law to Ohio's Constitution and propose a judicial response to
abortion cases in Ohio.
A. Explicit Textual Privacy Provision
Unlike the federal constitution, at least ten state constitutions contain
explicit textual privacy provisions. 96 A fundamental liberty has the greatest
recognition, and thus protection from governmental intrusion, where a
constitution provides specific textual recognition. 97 Thus, courts in states with
explicit textual privacy provisions may find it easier to deviate from the
Supreme Court's abortion rulings. Thus far only two state courts have
interpreted explicit textual privacy provisions to specifically protect abortion
rights.98 These two states are California99 and Florida. 100 The decision of the
courts no less than federal are and ought to be the guardians of our liberties." Id. at 491.
Justice Brennan explains that state bills of rights, before the enactment of the Fourteenth
Amendment, were the primary restraints on state action. He goes further to argue that state
constitutions should again become an independent source of protection for individual
liberties. Id. at 501-03; see also Right to Choose v. Byrne, 450 A.2d 925, 931 (N.J. 1982)
(finding that state constitutions can be interpreted as providing broader individual rights and
stating, "Although the federal Constitution may remain as the basic charter, state
Constitutions may serve as a supplemental source of fundamental liberties").
96 See ALASKA CoNST. art. I, § 22; Aiz. CONsT. art II, § 8; CAL. CONsT.,art. I, § 1;
FLA. CoNsT. art I, § 23; HAW. CoNsT. art I, § 6; ILL. CONST. art I, §§ 6, 12; LA. CoNST.
art I, § 5; MONT. CONST. art II, § 10; S.C. CONST. art I, § 10; WASH. CoNsT. art I, § 7.
Recall that the privacy right protected by the United States Constitution is based on "zones
of privacy" found in the Fourteenth Amendment. See supra part HI for further explanation.97 Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747,
789-90 (1986) (White, I., dissenting), overruled by Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S.
Ct. 2791 (1992).
98 Rachel N. Pine & Sylvia A. Law, Envisioning a Future for Reproductive Liberty:
Strategies for Making the Rights Real, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407, 435 n.110 (1992).
99 See Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779, 784 (Cal.
1981). The California Supreme Court held unconstitutional a California statute that withheld
Medi-Cal benefits from poor women seeking to obtain abortions. The court interpreted the
California Constitution, which states: "All people are by nature free and independent and
have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring,
possessing and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness and
privacy." CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1 (emphasis added). The court found that the federal right
to privacy is narrower than the right to privacy approved by the voters when they approved
an amendment which added the textual privacy provision to article I. Meyers, 625 P.2d at
784.
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Florida Supreme Court provides an excellent example of how a state court can
use its own constitution and judicial reasoning to broaden the privacy right for
women in its own state.
The Florida Supreme Court interpreted the Florida Constitution's textual
privacy provision in In re T.W., a Minor.01 In 1980, the people of Florida
voted to amend their state constitution to add an explicit right of privacy.1 2
The Florida Supreme Court in In re T W. found that the citizens of Florida, by
adopting the privacy amendment, wanted more protection from governmental
intrusion of their privacy than the federal constitution provides. 103 Under
Florida law, the right of a woman to end her pregnancy is a fundamental
right.104 The court further found that the appropriate standard of review of a
regulation affecting privacy is the "compelling state interest" standard. 05
At issue in In re T W. was a parental consent statute. 10 6 The Florida court
established that several state interests were involved in a minor's abortion
decision. The state, upon viability of the fetus, has a compelling interest in the
potentiality of human life.10 7 Upon viability, the state may protect its interest in
potential life by regulating abortion as long as the woman's health is not
endangered. 108 In the case of parental consent statutes the state has additional
10 See In re T.W., a Minor, No. 74-143, 1989 Fla. LEXIS 1226, (Fla. Oct. 12,
1989). For a more detailed discussion of this case, see infra notes 101-16 and
accompanying text.
101 Id.
102 FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23 provides in pertinent part: "Every natural person has the
right to be let alone and free from governmental intrusion into his private life except as
otherwise provided herein .... "
103 In re T.W., 1989 Fla. LEXIS 1226, at *13.
104 Id. at *17.
105 Id. at *16. The standard was articulated as follows: "[The standard] shifts the
burden of proof to the state to justify an intrusion on privacy. The burden can be met by
demonstrating that the challenged regulation serves a compelling state interest and
accomplishes its goal through the use of the least intrusive means." Id. But see Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992) (adopting the undue burden test, a "minimal
rationality" test, which allows abortion regulations to stand unless they impose "substantial
obstacles" to the exercise of the right to an abortion; restrictions that are not "substantial"
are lawful if at least minimally rational). See supra subpart II.B., notes 68-72 and
accompanying text.
106 FLA. STAT. ch. 390.001(4)(a) (1988).
107 In re T.W., 1989 Fla. LEXIS 1226, at *20. Compare to Casey where the Court
held that the state's interest in potential life is compelling throughout the pregnancy. See
supra subpart II.B. The Florida Supreme Court defines viability as the "point when the fetus
becomes capable of meaningful life outside the womb through standard medical measures,"
or approximately the second trimester. Id. at *21.
108 Id. at *21.
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interests in protection of the immature minor and preservation of the family
unit.109
The Florida Supreme Court found that none of these interests were
sufficient to override a minor woman's privacy right as protected by the
Florida Constitution's XXIII Amendment.110 The Florida court faulted the
Supreme Court's "relaxed" standard which was applied to parental consent and
notice statutes. The United States Supreme Court had found that the state
interest in protecting the minor or preserving the integrity of the family need
only be "significant" and not "compelling" to be valid.111 The Florida
Supreme Court held that the Florida Constitution required every restriction of
abortion rights to further a "compelling" state interest in order to be lawful.' 12
The court further held that the interests of protection of minors and preserving
family integrity were not sufficiently compelling to justify parental consent. 113
To be valid, a regulation must further a compelling state interest and must
utilize the least intrusive means to do so. The Florida court found that the
parental consent requirement also failed the second prong of the review
standard.1 14 Because the statute did not provide for a lawyer for the minor or a
record hearing, the court found that the statute did not adequately provide for
procedural safeguards against the intrusion the state sought to impose on the
minor's privacy right. 15 The court held that in a proceeding in which a minor
could be completely deprived of authority to exercise her fundamental right to
109 Id. at *22.
110 Id.
III See Akron I, 462 U.S. 416, 427 n.10 (1983) ("ITihe Court repeatedly has
recognized that, in view of the unique status of children under the law, the States have a
'significant' interest in certain abortion regulations aimed at protecting children 'that is not
present in the case of an adult.'") (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52,
75 (1976)).
112 In re T.W., 1989 Fla. LEXIS 1226, at * 24.
113 Id. at *25-26. To reach this conclusion the court found particularly relevant
Florida laws that allowed an unwed pregnant minor to consent to adoption. See FLA. STAT.
ch. 63 (1987). The court also reached this conclusion on the basis of Florida laws allowing
an unwed pregnant minor to consent to medical services for herself or her child. See FLA.
STAT. ch. 743.065 (1987). The court stated the following:
In light of this... authority that the state grants an unwed minor to make life-or-
death decisions concerning herself or an existing child without parental consent,
we are unable to discern a special compelling interest on the part of the state
under Florida law in protecting the minor only where abortion is concerned.
In re T.W., 1989 Fla Lexis 1226 at *25.
114 Id. at *26.
115 Id. at *26-27.
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privacy, the Florida Constitution requires she be represented by counsel and a
record hearing be held to memorialize a trial judge's reasons for denying a
petition for waiver of parental consent. 116 Thus, under Florida state
constitutional law, the parental consent statute was unconstitutional because it
did not further a compelling state interest through the least intrusive means.
The Florida court in In re T.W. utilized an explicit textual privacy
provision in the Florida Constitution to strike down a parental notification
statute. The court used the explicit provision as a means to "overrule" the
Supreme Court's precedent. With this provision, the Florida Supreme Court
was able to fashion a more stringent standard-the compelling interest
standard-than the Supreme Court's rational relationship test by which to judge
abortion regulations. Even without an explicit textual privacy provision, state
constitutions may contain broader language which allows state courts to find
adequate and independent grounds for protection of abortion rights.
B. Broader Language
Unlike the Florida Constitution, most state constitutions do not contain
explicit textual privacy provisions.117 Courts in these states may instead rely on
language in their state constitutions that sweeps more broadly than the federal
counterpart to protect more individual rights. An example of a constitution with
broader language is the New Jersey Constitution as interpreted in Right to
Choose v. Byrne.1 8
Right to Choose dealt with a challenge, by Medicaid-eligible women and
care providers, to a New Jersey statute which prohibited the use of state
Medicaid funds for abortions except where necessary to save the life of the
mother. 119 The statute contained no provision to fund abortions to protect the
health of the pregnant woman. The plaintiffs challenged the law on both equal
protection and free exercise of religion grounds under both the United States
and New Jersey Constitutions. 120 The New Jersey Supreme Court held that the
restriction on funds violated a woman's right to equal protection under the law
116 Id. at *27-29. The court stated that requiring a minor, untrained in the law, to
handle her own case alone "is to risk deterring many minors from pursuing their rights
because they are unable to understand how to navigate the complicated court system on
their own or because they are too intimidated by the seeming complexity to try." Id. at *28.
117 See supra note 96 for a list of state constitutions that do contain privacy provisions.
118 450 A.2d 925 (1982).
119 Id. at 927. The law at issue was N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4D-6.1 (West 1981).
12 0 Right to Choose, 450 A.2d at 929.
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of New Jersey. 12 1 The court also held that the appropriate standard of review is
strict scrutiny or the compelling state interest standard. 122
The trial court had held that the statute violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the federal constitution. During the interim between the trial and
appeal, the United States Supreme Court decided Harris v. McRae123 in which
the Court held that the denial of Medicaid funds for abortion does not violate
the federal constitution. Because of the Supremacy Clause, the New Jersey
court had to reverse the lower court as to the violation of the federal
constitutional issue. Thus, the court had to deal only with the New Jersey
Constitution's boundaries regarding abortion rights.
Before the New Jersey court turned to the substantive issues, it discussed
the role of state courts in the federal system. The court held that in some cases,
states may accord greater "respect" to certain fundamental rights than the
federal constitution. 124 The court held that where analogous provisions of the
federal and state constitutions differ, or where a state has a previously
established body of state law precedent that leads to a different result than
federal precedent, the state may then determine that a more expansive grant of
rights is supported by the state constitution. 125 The court did concede,
however, that a court must use caution to declare rights under the state
constitution that differ significantly from those under the federal constitution
because it is "generally advisable" to maintain uniform interpretation of
identical constitutional provisions. 126 The court thus went on to examine
whether and how the New Jersey Constitution differs from the federal
constitution.
The New Jersey Supreme Court had previously recognized that the New
Jersey Constitution may provide greater protection than the federal constitution
for some rights.' 27 To establish the background for the court's finding that the
New Jersey Constitution protects broader abortion rights than the federal
constitution, the court first noted that the New Jersey Constitution contains
121 Id. at 934-35.
122 Id. Note that the Florida Supreme Court has also held that the appropriate standard
of review of abortion restrictions is the compelling state interest standard. See supra note
105 and accompanying text.
123 448 U.S. 297 (1980); see also supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
124 Right to Choose, 450 A.2d at 931 ("Although the state Constitution may
encompass a smaller universe than the federal Constitution, our constellation of rights may
be more complete.").
125 Id. at 932.
126 Id.
1271d.; see State v. Alston, 440 A.2d 1311, 1319-20 (N.J. 1981) (discussing standing
to challenge searches and seizures); In re Grady, 426 A.2d 467, 474 (N.J. 1981) (discussing
right to sterilization).
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more expansive language than its federal counterpart. 128 Second, the court
found that the New Jersey equal protection clause has historically supported the
right to privacy. 129 Third, the court referred to "long standing principles" of
state law which protect a woman's right to choose an abortion to end a
pregnancy. 130
Even though the New Jersey court found that it has long protected privacy
rights of individuals, the court conceded that it frequently applies the same
standard of review to the state constitution as the Supreme Court applies to the
federal constitution. 131 The court explained that the federal Supreme Court
analyzed equal protection issues under two tiers of judicial review-strict
scrutiny and the rational relationship test.132 Strict scrutiny is applied only to
cases which involve a fundamental right or members of a suspect class. Relying
on federal Supreme Court precedent, the court held that neither poverty nor
pregnancy gives rise to membership in a suspect class. 133 The court also relied
on federal precedent when it held that funding for an abortion is not a
fundamental right. Relying on the federal Supreme Court's Roe precedent the
court held, however, that the right to choose whether to have an abortion is a
fundamental right of all pregnant women including those entitled to Medicaid
reimbursement for medically necessary treatment. 134 Thus, because a
fundamental right was at issue, the court applied strict scrutiny or the
compelling state interest standard.
128 Right to Choose, 450 A.2d at 933. The New Jersey Constitution provides: "All
persons are by nature free and independent, and have certain natural and inalienable rights,
among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing,
and protecting property, and of pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness." NJ.
CONST. art. I, para. 1. The United States Constitution provides in pertinent part: "No state
shall.., deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
129 Right to Choose, 450 A.2d at 934.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Id. Applying strict scrutiny, the challenged legislation will be upheld as long as a
compelling state interest supports the classification and no less restrictive alternative is
available. The rational relationship test requires only that the government classification be
rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Even though the federal Supreme Court has
also used a middle-tier or "intermediate" scrutiny, the New Jersey court chose to discuss it
separately in a later portion of the decision.
133 Id.
134 Id.
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While the state argued that it had a compelling interest in the protection of
potential life, 135 the court disagreed and found the state's interest to be
legitimate but not compelling as required by the strict scrutiny standard. 136
Further, the statute denied equal protection to those women for whom an
abortion was medically necessary but whose lives were not endangered.137 The
court held that the statute impermissibly gave priority to potential life at the
expense of maternal health. 138 Because the statute denied equal protection to
those exercising their constitutional right to choose a medically necessary
abortion, it was invalidated using the strict scrutiny standard of the state equal
protection clause.
The Right to Choose decision is intriguing for several reasons. First, it is
one of just a few cases in which a court has attempted to fashion the right to an
abortion from an equal protection clause. Second, the New Jersey court boldly
rejected precedent of the United States Supreme Court to fashion its own
interpretation of its own constitution regarding the right to an abortion. Many
state courts simply adopt the will of the federal Supreme Court with little or no
real analysis of their own constitution or its history or precedent. 139 The New
Jersey court boldly pronounced that the New Jersey Constitution is an
independent font of individual rights that extend beyond those rights protected
under the federal constitution.
C. State History and Precedent as a Source of State Constitutional
Interpretation
Some state courts rely on their own historical precedent to protect more
privacy rights than does the Supreme Court. The state courts rely on their past
interpretation of their state constitutions for analysis independent of the
Supreme Court. This type of constitutional interpretation involves a more
complex and convoluted analysis than do the two types of analyses previously
discussed. A well-reasoned and apt example of this third type of analysis is
contained in a decision rendered by the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts in Moe v. Secretary of Administration.140
In this case the court decided that a state law restricting availability of
Medicaid funds only to those abortions necessary to save the life of the
135 Id. at 935. The state also conceded that its purpose was to influence the woman's
decision about whether to have an abortion or go through with childbirth. Id. at 934.
136 Id. at 935 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163-65 (1973)) (emphasis added).
137 Id. at 934.
138 Id. at 935.
139 See Doe v. Maher, 515 A.2d 134 (Conn. 1986).
140 417 N.E.2d 387 (Mass. 1981).
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pregnant woman while not funding medically necessary abortions violated the
due process provision of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.1 41 The court
began its constitutional analysis by surveying a long line of its own cases that
protect a broad right of privacy. 142 The court recognized that its decisions
considering the Massachusetts due process guarantee "sometimes impelled us
to go further than the United States Supreme Court." 143 After establishing its
own history of protecting a wide range of privacy rights, the court then turned
to the constitutional application at issue.
The court recognized that the regulation at issue in Moe was substantially
identical to that scrutinized in Harris v. McRae.144 At the plaintiff's urging, the
court held that the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights grants a greater degree
of protection of abortion rights than does the federal constitution as interpreted
in Harris.145 The court was particularly persuaded by the argument that when a
state decides to alleviate some of the hardship of poverty, it may not then
dispense funds in such a way as to burden the exercise of a fundamental
right. 146
The court analyzed several Supreme Court decisions which examined the
constitutional limitations on the manner in which a state may allocate welfare
and poverty benefits. These decisions considered the limitations on state denial
of benefits in the context of First and Fifth Amendment liberties. 147 Ultimately
the court summed up its constitutional analysis by stating: "Our prior decisions
demonstrate that our Declaration of Rights affords the privacy rights asserted
here no less protection than those guaranteed by the First or Fifth Amendments
141 Id. at 397.
142 Id. at 398-99; see Custody of A Minor, 389 N.E.2d 68, 72 (Mass. 1979)
(recognizing as a "cardinal precept of [Massachusetts] jurisprudence" that family life is a
private realm the state cannot enter); Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v.
Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 426 (Mass. 1977) (holding that the "constitutional right to
privacy... is an expression of the sanctity of individual free choice and self-determination
as fundamental constituents of life"); Framingham Clinic, Inc. v. Selectmen of
Southborough, 367 N.E.2d 606, 612 (Mass. 1977) (invalidating a zoning law designed to
exclude abortion clinics from town and emphasizing the "negative constitutional principle"
underlying privacy law); Doe v. Doe, 314 N.E.2d 128, 130-32 (Mass. 1974) (preventing a
husband from vetoing a wife's abortion decision).
143 Moe, 417 N.E.2d at 399.
144 Id. at 399-400. For a discussion of Harris, see supra notes 28-38 and
accompanying text.
145 Moe, 417 N.E.2d at 400.
146 Id. at 401.
147 Id. at 401-02. The Supreme Court has held that the state may not impose an
indirect obstacle on a student group's free speech and associational rights. Healy v. James,
408 U.S. 169 (1972).
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of the Federal Constitution." 148 The court adopted the reasoning of Justice
Brennan's dissent in Harris to find that the regulation deprives an indigent
woman of her freedom to choose abortion over childbirth and thus infringes the
due process right guaranteed by the state constitution. 149
The court then turned to the balancing of interests. While the court could
have followed Roe's test which would require the state to show that the
regulation was narrowly tailored to further a compelling state interest, it instead
turned to its own balancing principles. 150 The court found that the state interest
involved in Moe was the preservation of potential life. Against this interest the
court weighed the pregnant woman's interest in choosing a medically necessary
abortion. 151 The court held that the "nine months of enforced pregnancy
inherent in effectuating these regulations are only a prelude to the ultimate
burden the State seeks to impose." 152 The restriction on Medicaid funds for
medically necessary abortions was struck down as unconstitutional under the
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. 153
The Moe decision of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts is just
one example of how a judicially activist court may use its own precedent and
reasoning to broaden rights beyond those protected by the federal constitution.
Courts that have a history of interpreting privacy rights broadly in the areas of
involuntary life-saving medical treatment or other private family decisions may
apply these precedents to abortion cases. State courts can thus rely on their own
judicial reasoning to broaden the scope of personal privacy in the context of
abortion.
Based on the foregoing, a state court may be able to use a textual privacy
provision in its state constitution as a tool for finding a broader right to
abortion than is protected by the federal constitution. State courts may also find
that their state constitutions contain more sweeping language than does the
federal constitution and this allows them to protect more individual liberties. A
state court may go further and find that its own precedent and state history
protect a broader privacy right than does the federal constitution. All of these
tactics deal with interpretation of state constitutions to provide broad privacy
rights. These methods may be used by other state courts to protect broad
14 8 Moe, 417 N.E.2d at 402.
149 Id.
150 Id. at 402-03. For a more detailed discussion of Roe's balancing, see supra notes
3-12 and accompanying text. See also In re T.W., A Minor, No. 74-143, 1989 Fla. LEXIS
1226 (Fla. Oct. 12, 1989); supra notes 100-16 and accompanying text.
151 Moe, 417 N.E.2d at 404.
152 Id.
153 Id.
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privacy rights as they grapple with restrictive abortion laws passed by state
antiabortion legislatures.
IV. APPLICATION TO OHIO CONSTITUTION
Several state courts have grappled with challenges to legislative restrictions
on the exercise of a woman's right to choose an abortion. The Ohio Supreme
Court has yet to decide a case in which it defined the extent to which the Ohio
Constitution protects a right to abortion. The court will more than likely have a
chance to determine the boundaries of abortion rights in Ohio within the next
year as the case Preterm aeveland v. Voinovich' 54 winds its way to the Ohio
Supreme Court. This Part will analyze the Preterm decisions and then apply the
framework set forth in Part M to the Ohio Constitution.
A. A Recent Case Interpreting Ohio's Constitution: Preterm Cleveland
v. Voinovich
The most recent and most restrictive abortion law passed in Ohio to date is
commonly known as "House Bill 108." 155 Governor Voinovich signed the bill
into law in July of 1991.156 House Bill 108 creates several conditions that must
be satisfied before an abortion may be performed. The law creates a mandatory
twenty-four hour waiting period before an abortion may be performed or
induced. 157 At least twenty-four hours before the abortion the physician must
give the woman specific information, 158 in a private setting, and must give her
adequate opportunity to ask questions about the abortion. 159 Abortion providers
must also purchase and provide the pregnant woman copies of a pamphlet 160
154 No. 92CVHO1-528, 1992 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 1 (Franklin County C.P. May 27,
1992), rev'd, No. 92AP-791, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 3770 (Ohio Ct. App. July 27, 1993).
155 Offo pEv. CODE ANN. § 2317.56 (Baldwin 1992). This law is substantially similar
to the Pennsylvania law that the Supreme Court upheld almost in its entirety in Casey. See
supra notes 58-75 and accompanying text.
15 6 Preterm aeveland, 1992 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 1, at *1.
157 OMoRnv. CODE ANN. § 2317.56(B)(1) (Baldwin 1992).
158 Id. The physician must inform the woman of the following: "(a) The nature and
purpose of the particular abortion procedure to be used and the medical risks associated
with that procedure; (b) The probable gestational age of the embryo or fetus; (c) The
medical risks associated with the pregnant woman carrying her pregnancy to term." Id.
159 Id. § 2317.56(B)(2).
160 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.56(C)(1)-(2) (describing the materials that must be
given to the woman twenty-four hours prior to the abortion). The statute provides in
pertinent part:
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published by the state that describes the embryo and fetus at two-week intervals
and provides a list of agencies that offer alternatives to abortion. 161 The statute
also requires the woman to sign a consent form which certifies that she
received the published materials and that she consents to the abortion
voluntarily. 162
In January of 1992, House Bill 108 was challenged as violating several
provisions of both the Ohio and United States Constitutions in Preterm
Cleveland v. Voinovich. 163 The common pleas court granted the plaintiff's
request for declaratory and injunctive relief, holding that House Bill 108
violated several provisions of both the Ohio and United States Constitutions.1 64
The court of appeals reversed this decision, holding that the law violates
neither the Ohio nor the United States Constitution. 165 Analyzing the manner in
which these courts interpreted the Ohio Constitution will provide a useful
illustration of how the Ohio Supreme Court could interpret the Ohio
Constitution in the future.
Like the New Jersey Supreme Court in Right to Choose, both the common
pleas and appeals courts in Preterm Cleveland recognized that state courts can,
based on state constitutions, extend personal liberties beyond those protected by
(1) Materials that inform the pregnant woman about family planning information, of
publicly funded agencies that are available to assist her in family planning, and of public
and private agencies and services that are available to assist her through her pregnancy,
upon childbirth, and while her child is dependent, including, but not limited to, adoption
agencies ....
(2) Materials that inform the pregnant woman of the probable anatomical and
physiological characteristics of the zygote, blastocyte, embryo, or fetus at two-week
gestational increments for the first sixteen weeks of her pregnancy and at four-week
gestational increments from the seventeenth week of her pregnancy to full term,
including any relevant information regarding the time at which the fetus possibly would
be viable. . .. If the materials use a pictorial, photographic, or other depiction to
provide information... the materials shall include, in a conspicuous manner, a scale or
other explanation. . . that can be used to determine the actual size of the zygote,
blastocyte, embryo, or fetus at a particular gestational increment ....
Id.
161 Id. § 2317.56(B)(3)(b)-(c).
162 Id. § 2317.56(B)(4)(a)-(b).
163 Preterm Cleveland v. Voinovich, No. 92CVH01-528, 1992 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 1
(Franlin County C.P. May 27, 1992), rev'd, No. 92AP-791, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 3770
(Ohio Ct. App. July 27, 1993).
16 4 preterm Ceveland, 1992 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 1.
165 Preterm aeveland, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 3770. This court decided the case
based only on a facial challenge to House Bill 108. Because of the undue burden test,
abortion rights litigants should raise both "facial" and "as applied" challenges to abortion
laws.
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the federal constitution. The common pleas court noted that the federal
constitution provides a floor of minimum protection of individual rights and
that where there are textual differences between the state and federal
constitutions, the state can create its own interpretation. 166 The appellate court
stated that it was "obvious" that the Ohio Constitution could grant greater
rights than are conferred by the United States Constitution. 167 However, the
court of appeals further found that Ohio courts have had "little occasion" to
apply Ohio constitutional provisions rather than parallel federal constitutional
provisions since the latter have generally been construed to impose the same or
greater restrictions on state action. 168 Each court did, however, analyze the
challenge to House Bill 108 under the Ohio Constitution.
The common pleas court in Preterm Ceveland used all three methods of
state constitutional analysis outlined above. The court first determined that
Ohio's Constitution contains a "freedom of conscience" provision, which is not
found in the United States Constitution. The plaintiffs in Preterm Ceveland
argued that by requiring abortion providers to distribute state-created pamphlets
and by imposing procedural obstacles to obtaining an abortion, House Bill 108
violates the freedom of conscience guarantee of the Ohio Constitution. 169 The
court found that the only analogous federal provisions are the Establishment' 70
and Free Exercise' 7' clauses of the First Amendment. The court observed that
while the federal constitutional provisions are "tied to religion," the Ohio
166 Preterm Cleveland, 1992 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 1, *4-5. The court cited City of
Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 293 (1982) and PruneYard Shopping Ctr.
v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980).
167 Preterm Ceveland, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 3770, at *5 (citing State v. Brown,
588 N.E.2d 113 (1992), cert. denied, Ohio v. Brown, 113 S. Ct. 182 (1992), which held
that Ohio courts are free to deviate from U.S. Supreme Court precedent when interpreting
analogous provisions of the Ohio Constitution).
168 Preterm Ceveland, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 3770, at *6.
169 The Ohio Constitution provides in pertinent part:
All men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty God according
to the dictates of their own conscience. No person shall be compelled to attend,
erect, or support any place of worship, or maintain any form of worship, against
his consent; and no preference shall be given, by law, to any religious society; nor
shall any interference with the rights of conscience be pemited ....
OHIo CONST. art. I, § 7 (emphasis added).
170 "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion .... " U.S.
CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).
171 "Congress shall make no law.., prohibiting the free exercise [of religion] ...
U.S. CONST. amend I (emphasis added).
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Constitution embraces the more sweeping concept of "conscience." 172 The
court held that the freedom of conscience guarantee prevents the state from
interfering in decisions that involve "deeply-held moral" and philosophical
convictions and that a woman's decision to abort her pregnancy is such a
"deeply-held moral" decision which affects the direction of her life. 173
In contrast, the court of appeals found that "nothing in either the language
or the history" of the freedom of conscience clause supported the trial court's
holding. 174 This court held that the right to conscience is connected to religion
and is not to be taken in a secular context.175 The court noted that the secular
concepts of "moral" and "philosophical" choices are protected by the freedom
of conscience clause only when predicated upon "bona fide religious
beliefs." 176 Thus, the court held that House Bill 108 does not infringe upon
any religious rights and thus is not facially invalid under Article I, Section 7 of
the Ohio Constitution. 177
The common pleas court also relied on the second method of analysis,
broader language, to invalidate House Bill 108. The court determined that the
free speech guarantee 178 of the Ohio Constitution sweeps more broadly than its
federal counterpart. The court found that Ohio's free speech provision contains
two distinct clauses, only the second of which corresponds to the federal
provision. The court concluded that the drafters of the Ohio Constitution
intended to offer greater protection to speech than is afforded by the First
Amendment. 179 The court relied on Ohio's free speech provision as well as
decisions of other courts to find that House Bill 108 violates the free speech
172 Preterm Cleveland v. Voinovich, No. 92CVH01-528, 1992 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 1,
at *14 (Franklin County C.P. May 27, 1992) ("Freedom of conscience necessarily includes
moral and philosophical views that lay outside the confines of established religion."), rev'd,
No. 92AP-791, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 3770 (Ohio Ct. App. July 27, 1993).
173 Id. at *15.
174 Preterm Cleveland, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 3770, at *23.
175 Id.
176 Id. at *24.
177 Id. at *25. The court decided to "afford proper perspective" to the constitutional
rights involved so as to allow the state to promote its interest and require a woman to be
"fully informed."
178 The Ohio Constitution provides: "Every citizen may freely speak, write, and
publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of the right; and no
law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech, or of the press." OHIO
CONST. art. I, § 11.
179 Preterm Cleveland v. Voinovich, No. 92CVH01-528, 1992 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 1,
at *16 (Franklin County C.P. May 27, 1992), rev'd, No. 92AP-791, 1993 Ohio App.
LEXIS 3770 (Ohio Ct. App. July 27, 1993).
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guarantee by compelling abortion providers to distribute certain state-created
pamphlets and by requiring physicians to communicate in state-mandated ways.
The court of appeals reversed the common pleas court on this issue,
holding that nothing in House Bill 108 prohibits anyone from freely spealdng,
writing, or publishing their thoughts on anything-including abortion. 180 The
court reasoned that while House Bill 108 requires the dissemination of state-
printed materials, the law does not prohibit an abortion provider from giving a
woman any other materials.18' The court also seemed persuaded that because
the statute requires the information provided to be "objective and
nonjudgmental" and to include only "accurate scientific information," that the
state-mandated materials do not restrict free speech. 182 Thus, the court of
appeals held that House Bill 108 does not violate Ohio's freedom of speech
guarantee.
The common pleas court again used a broader language analysis to hold
that House Bill 108 violates the liberty and privacy guarantees of the Ohio
Constitution and is thus facially unconstitutional. 183 The court determined that
the liberty right in Ohio' 84 differs from its federal analogue because it is neither
tied to nor limited by a due process clause. 185 The court held that a right to
18 0 Preterm Cleveland, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 3770, at *27.
181 Id. The court stated that requiring the distribution of the pamphlet does not
interfere with the freedom of speech any more than does the availability of a civil action for
defamation. Id. at *28.
182 Id. at *27. The court again alluded to the fact that the plaintiffs did not properly
challenge the effect of the law but only posed a facial challenge to House Bill 108. The
court stated as follows:
Plaintiffs' concern that the Department of Health may not comply with the
statutory mandate that the material be objective and nonjudgmental and include
only accurate scientific information does not give rise to a violation of the freedom
of speech provisions . . . .This court will not presume that the Department of
Health will not comply with the mandate of the statute, and any such contention is
premature in any event.
Id. at *28-29.
183 Preterm Ceveland, 1992 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 1, at *13.
184 The Ohio Constitution provides: "All men are, by nature, free and independent,
and have certain inalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life
and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and seeking and obtaining
happiness and safety." OHIo CoNsT. art. I, § 1 (emphasis added).
185 Preterm Cleveland, 1992 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 1, at *7. The U.S. Constitution
provides: "Nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process oflaw." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV § 1 (emphasis added). Compare to the language
of the Ohio Constitution as set forth supra, note 184.
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privacy is implicit in the Ohio Constitution's liberty guarantee and that this
right is sufficiently broad to protect abortion rights.18 6
The court of appeals, in a somewhat confusing discussion, reversed the
court of common pleas on this issue. First, the court of appeals recognized that
Article I, Section 1 of the Ohio Constitution grants "extensive rights" to the
individual. 187 This provision renders the Ohio Constitution broader, the court
reasoned, than the federal constitution because it "appears to recognize so-
called 'natural law'" which is not expressly recognized in the United States
Constitution.18 8 Interestingly, the court did not first find that the Ohio
Constitution contains a right to privacy 18 9 and then hold that this right to
privacy includes the right to choose an abortion to terminate pregnancy.
Instead, the court held that "it would seem almost axiomatic" that the right to
choose an abortion is subject to constitutional protection.1 90
Even though the appellate court held that the Ohio Constitution contains
broader language, it nevertheless reversed the holding of the common pleas
court. The Court of Appeals applied the undue burden standard as explicated
in Casey, rather than the compelling state interest test, to hold that House Bill
108 does not abridge a woman's right to choose an abortion. 19' The court
decided that it had "little choice" but to apply the undue burden standard to its
interpretation of the Ohio Constitution except for when the Ohio Constitution
affords greater restrictions upon state action than does the federal
constitution. 192 The court summarily decided that the undue burden test rather
than the compelling state interest test applied to abortion restrictions under the
Ohio Constitution.1 93 Because the House Bill 108 provisions are substantially
186 Preterm Cleveland, 1992 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 1, at *10-13.
187 Preterm Cleveland v. Voinovich, No. 92AP-791, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 3770, at
*8 (Ohio Ct. App. July 27, 1993) (citing Palmer v. Tingle, 45 N.E. 313 (Ohio 1896)).
188 Preterm Cleveland, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 3770, at *9.
189 The court did, however, find that Ohio recognizes a common law right to privacy
as held in Housh v. Peth, 133 N.E.2d 340 (Ohio 1956). Pretenn Cleveland, 1993 Ohio
App. LEXIS 3770, at *11.
190 Preterm Cleveland, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 3770, at *10.
191 Id. at *18-19. In fact, the court explicitly stated that because of broader language
in the Ohio Constitution, the court did not have to balance rights using the undue burden test
but could apply a different standard of its own choosing. Id. at *11, n.5.19 2 Id. at *18.
193 Id. If the court recognized that it need not follow Supreme Court precedent
because of the Ohio Constitution's broader language, it is unclear how it felt constrained to
apply the undue burden standard. The court should have first decided whether Ohio's
constitutional language, precedent, and history support a broader interpretation of abortion
law. The court then should have determined which standard would be appropriate for a
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similar to the Pennsylvania provisions at issue in Casey, the court held that the
law did not impose an undue burden on a woman's right to an abortion and
thus is constitutional. 194
The common pleas court again employed the broader language analysis to
invalidate House Bill 108 under Ohio's equal protection guarantee. The
plaintiffs in Preterm Cleveland argued that House Bill 108 deprives women of
equal protection of the law under the Ohio Constitution. 195 The plaintiffs
argued that the direct impact of any measure regulating or restricting abortion
falls on a class consisting exclusively of women. The court noted that neither
the Ohio nor the United States Supreme Court have used an equal protection
analysis as a means of invalidating abortion restrictions. 196 The court
recognized, however, that several other states have used their own state equal
protection provisions to invalidate abortion restrictions. 197
While the equal protection clause of the Ohio Constitution had never been
invoked in the abortion context, the court found nothing in its text or history to
prevent "interpretation consistent with decisions from other states." 198 Relying
reading consistent with the Ohio Constitution's broader language. The actual result of the
court of appeals is a mystery.
194 Id. at *19-22. Note that the challenge in Preterm Cleveland was a facial challenge
to the law. The results may be different if a plaintiff attempts to prove that the actual effect
of the law in an isolated case is unconstitutional.
195 Preterm Cleveland v. Voinovich, No. 92CVH01-528, 1992 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 1,
at *18 (Franklin County C.P. May 27, 1992), rev'd, No. 92AP-791, 1993 Ohio App.
LEXIS 3770 (Ohio Ct. App. July 27, 1993).
All political power is inherent in the people. Government is instituted for their equal
protection and benefit, and they have the right to alter, reform, or abolish the same,
whenever they may deem it necessary; and no special privileges or immunities shall
ever be granted, that may not be altered, revoked, or repealed by the general assembly.
OHIO CONST. art. , § 2.
196 Preter Cleveland, 1992 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 1, at *19-20.
197 See Right to Choose v. Byrne, 450 A.2d 925 (N.J. 1982) (invalidating state
restrictions on the use of public funding for abortions based on Article I, paragraph 1 of the
New Jersey Constitution); Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 625 P.2d
779 (Cal. 1981) (holding that state law which restricted use of Medi-Cal funds for abortion
violates the California Constitution). See also supra part IMI for a more detailed discussion of
how several states have utilized their own constitutions to invalidate state regulation of
abortion.
198 Preterm Cleveland, 1992 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 1, at *19-20. The court cited several
state court decisions that have utilized their own state equal protection provisions protect a
woman's right to choose an abortion. See Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v.
Myers, 625 P.2d 779 (Cal. 1981); Doe v. Maher, 515 A.2d 134 (Conn. 1986); Right to
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on the language of the Ohio Constitution, the court found that the statute
violated the equal protection clause because it "imposes burdens upon women's
reproductive choices that are not imposed upon the reproductive choices of
men, and also because it hinders the ability of women to participate fully and
equally in society."199
The court of appeals again disagreed with the common pleas court and
held that House Bill 108 does not violate the equal protection guarantee of the
Ohio Constitution.2°° The court noted that the Ohio Supreme Court has often
held that the equal protection guarantee of the Ohio Constitution is essentially
identical to that of the federal constitution.201 The court then discussed U.S.
Supreme Court precedent on equal protection.
The court of appeals relied on federal precedent to hold that regulations
concerning abortion do not constitute gender-based classifications. The United
States Supreme Court has held that an exclusion of pregnancy from a disability
benefits plan is not gender-based discrimination under the Fourteenth
Amendment.202 Because these restrictions do not involve a gender-based
classification, they are subject to a mere rationality standard in which the
regulations will be upheld if they further a legitimate state interest. The court
cited with approval the holding of Casey that the state has a legitimate goal of
protecting the life of the unborn and may enact legislation that expresses a
preference for childbirth over abortion.20 3 Thus, the court held that for
precisely the reasons that the Pennsylvania statute in Casey did not violate the
Fourteenth Amendment, House Bill 108 does not violate the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or of the Ohio Constitution.
While the common pleas court invalidated House Bill 108 in its entirety,
the court of appeals upheld the validity of the statute in its entirety and
completely overruled the common pleas court. These two decisions constitute
Choose, 450 A.2d 925; Hope v. Perales, 571 N.Y.S.2d 972 (Sup. Ct. 1991), afid, 595
N.Y.S.2d 948 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993).
199 Preterm Cleveland, 1992 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 1, at *20.
2 00 Preterm Cleveland v. Voinovich, No. 92AP-791, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 3770, at
*36-37 (Ohio Ct. App. July 27, 1993).
201 Id. (citing Conley v. Shearer, 595 N.E.2d 862, 866-67 (Ohio 1992); Beatty v.
Akron City Hosp., 424 N.E.2d 586, 591-92 (Ohio 1981); State ex rel. Heller v. Miller,
399 N.E.2d 66, 67 (Ohio 1980); Kinney v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 322 N.E.2d
880, 882 (Ohio 1975)).
202 See General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 133--4 (1976); Geduldig v.
Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496-97 n.20 (1974) (stating that while only women can become
pregnant, not every legislative classification concerning pregnancy is a sex-based
classification and thus these classifications are subject only to the rational basis test).
203 Preterm Cleveland, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 3770, at *40-42 (citing Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992)).
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the only decisions that analyze to any extent the bases and boundaries of
abortion rights in Ohio. The next section will provide a proposed analysis
which the Ohio Supreme Court or other state supreme courts with similar
constitutional provisions may use to interpret state constitutions and to evaluate
abortion rights.
B. Proposal for Interpretation of the Ohio Constitution
The Ohio Supreme Court has not yet interpreted the Ohio Constitution as it
applies to abortion rights. The Preterm Ceveland case will likely be appealed
to the Ohio Supreme Court. When the Ohio court hears this or a similar case,
it may use the Ohio Constitution to protect more privacy rights for Ohio
citizens than are protected by the federal constitution. What follows is a model
for analysis of the Ohio Constitution as it applies to abortion rights.
Part LII of this Note delineated a framework for analyzing whether a given
state constitution protects more privacy rights than does the federal
constitution. Using this framework, one must first analyze whether the Ohio
Constitution contains an explicit textual privacy provision. If it does not, the
constitution must be examined for provisions that may contain a right to
privacy but contain no analogue in the United States Constitution. Second, one
must determine if the Ohio Constitution contains language that sweeps more
broadly than the federal constitution. Third, one must analyze the history and
precedent in Ohio to determine whether Ohio's history supports the finding that
Ohio's Constitution protects broader abortion rights than does the federal
constitution. Using this framework, a court could conclude that Ohio's
Constitution does indeed protect more abortion rights than does the United
States Constitution.
The Ohio Constitution contains no explicit textual guarantee of privacy.
Therefore, the mode of analysis employed by the California and Florida
Supreme Courts204 is inapplicable to the Ohio Constitution. The Ohio
Constitution does, however, contain a unique provision, the "freedom of
conscience" provision, with no federal counterpart.
The freedom of conscience clause is contained in Article I of the Ohio
Constitution.20 5 The first part of the article is religious in nature and accords a
right to "worship Almighty God according to the dictates of one's own
conscience."206 This portion of the provision closely mirrors the
204 See supra subpart lII.A and notes 96-116 and accompanying text for a more
thorough discussion of the interpretation of explicit textual privacy provisions.
205 Oflo CONST. art. I, § 7. See supra note 169 for full text.
206 OHuo CONST. art. I, § 7 (emphasis added).
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Establishment2o7 and Free Exercise20 8 Clauses of the federal constitution. If the
article contained only this first provision, the argument that it should protect a
woman's right to an abortion would be very weak.
The article contains another clause, however, that arguably extends beyond
the religion-based First Amendment analysis. The last sentence of Article I
states, "nor shall any interference with the rights of conscience be
permitted." 209 The trial court in Preterm aeveland2 10 was persuaded that
"conscience" refers to more than the tenets of established religion.211
Conscience involves deeply moral and philosophical beliefs of the
individual. 212 Because a woman's decision is such a personally moral,
philosophical decision, it should be protected by Ohio's freedom of conscience
provision. Justice Stevens recently stated:
A woman considering abortion faces "a difficult choice having serious and
personal consequences of major importance to her own future--perhaps to the
salvation of her own immortal soul." The authority to make such traumatic and
yet empowering decisions is an element of basic human dignity. . . . [A]
woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy is nothing less than a matter of
conscience.2
13
A woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy is a deeply moral choice that
fundamentally alters her life. Thus, Ohio's freedom of conscience provision
should protect a woman's right to choose abortion to terminate her pregnancy.
While the first clause of Article I of the Ohio Constitution-that tied to
religion-has been interpreted by the Ohio Supreme Court, the freedom of
conscience clause has not been accorded any special interpretation. Historically,
Article I has been interpreted to follow federal First Amendment precedent
207 See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
208 See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
209 O-1O CONST. art. I, § 7. See supra note 169 for full text.
210 Preterm Cleveland v. Voinovich, No. 92CVHO-528, 1992 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 1
(Franklin County C.P. May 27, 1992), rev'd, No. 92AP-791, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 3770
(Ohio Ct. App. July 27, 1993). See also supra subpart IVA for more detailed discussion of
this case.
211 See supra notes 172-73 and accompanying text.
212 Id.
213 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2840 (1992) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Thornburgh v. American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 781 (1986), overnded by Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992)) (emphasis added).
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closely.214 The court has not recently rendered an opinion dealing expressly
with the freedom of conscience provision in a nonreligious context. The state's
own precedent would weigh against a broader reading of this clause.
The history of the clause should not, however, be dispositive. If Article I
was meant to do nothing more than mimic federal constitutional law, the
framers would not have inserted the last clause dealing solely with the freedom
of conscience. The first clause covers the independent First Amendment
religious freedoms. Thus, a strong argument exists to support the fact that the
framers of the Ohio Constitution intended more freedom for individual choice
by inserting the freedom of conscience clause. An Ohio court could correctly
find that because a woman's decision to abort her pregnancy is a deeply moral
and personal decision of conscience, the freedom of conscience clause of the
Ohio Constitution protects such a decision. By imposing a waiting period and
requiring that a woman receive state-mandated materials, House Bill 108
reflects the state legislature's lack of respect for a woman's deeply personal,
moral, and philosophical choice. The law is thus not only patronizing but also
interferes with a woman's own decisionmaking process. The freedom of
conscience clause of the Ohio Constitution should be interpreted broadly to
protect a woman's right to an abortion and thus to invalidate those portions of
House Bill 108 that interfere with a woman's own decision to obtain an
abortion.
Even without an explicit textual privacy provision or a unique
constitutional provision, a state court may find that its state constitution
contains language that sweeps more broadly than its federal counterpart. The
privacy right, which encompasses a woman's right to choose an abortion, has
been found in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 215 Ohio's
Constitution has a similar clause which protects a more general notion of
liberty.216 The most obvious difference between the two clauses is that the
214 See Pater v. Pater, 588 N.E.2d 794 (Ohio 1992) (holding that a court may not
restrict noncustodial parent's right to expose her child to religious beliefs unless conflict
between parents' religious beliefs affect the child's welfare); State v. Biddings, 550 N.E.2d
975 (Ohio 1988) (holding that criminal defendant who objects to taking of blood sample for
DNA testing based on religious beliefs may be ordered to provide blood sample if state has
a compelling and paramount interest); In re Milton, 505 N.E.2d 255 (Ohio 1987) (holding
that a patient could refuse medical treatment because of religious belie0, cert. denied, sub
nor. Ohio Dep't of Mental Health v. Milton, 484 U.S. 820 (1987). All of these decisions
were based jointly on the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 7
of the Ohio Constitution.
215 U.S. CoNsT. amend. XV, § 1 provides the following: "Nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." Id.
216 "All men are, by nature, free and independent, and have certain inalienable rights,
among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing,
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Ohio liberty provision is not connected to a due process clause. Additionally,
the Ohio clause speaks more broadly of "freedom" and "independence" and
"seeking and obtaining happiness." Thus, Ohio's liberty guarantee is more
broad than the liberty guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment. 217
Perhaps the most intriguing possibility for the expansion of abortion rights
in Ohio is the Equal Protection Clause. Both of the courts rendering decisions
in Preterm Cleveland spoke to the issue of whether Ohio's equal protection
clause protects a woman's right to an abortion. While the common pleas court
relied on an independent state constitutional analysis to hold that the right to an
abortion is protected by the Ohio equal protection clause,218 the court of
appeals flatly rejected this interpretation and relied on federal precedent to hold
that Ohio's equal protection clause does not protect a woman's right to choose
abortion.
Some commentators have opined that contrary to the holding of the United
States Supreme Court, regulation of abortion is inherently gender-based
regulation. 219 They argue that because only women can become pregnant, any
restriction on the right of women to freely control their reproduction is an
impingement upon a woman's right to equality. Because such a regulation is
based on gender, an intermediate level of scrutiny applies under an equal
protection analysis. Others have argued that not every legislative classification
and protecting property, and seeking and obtaining happiness and safety." OHIO CoNsT. art.
I,§ 1.
217 See Preterm Cleveland v. Voinovich, No. 92CVH01-528, 1992 Ohio Misc. LEXIS
1 (Franklin County C.P. May 27, 1992), rev'd, No. 92AP-791, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS
3770 (Ohio Ct. App. July 27, 1993); see supra notes 166-169 and accompanying text.
218 Preter Cleveland, 1992 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 1, at *19-20 (noting that there is
nothing in the text or history of the Ohio Constitution to prevent an interpretation consistent
with other states).
219 See Ginsburg, supra note 13, at 182 (citing with approval other authors who have
argued that abortion regulations concern women's position in society in relation to men and
stating that: "It is not a sufficient answer to charge it all to women's anatomy-a natural, not
man-made, phenomenon. Society, not anatomy, 'places a greater stigma on unmarried
women who become pregnant than on the men who father their children.'"); Jane
Rutherford, The Myth of Due Process, 72 B.U. L. REv. 1, 73, n.385 (1992) (stating that
because only women bear children, state limitations on a woman's procreative choice
discriminate on the basis of gender); Andrea M. Sharrin, Note, Potential Fathers and
Abortion: A Woman's Womb is Not A Man's Castle, 55 BROOKLYN L. REv. 1359, n.17
(1990); Laurence H. Tribe, 77e Abortion Funding Conundrm." Inalienable Rights,
Affirmative Duties, and the Dilemma of Dependence, 99 HARV. L. REv. 330 (1985) (urging
that a woman's right to an abortion and abortion funding should not be grounded in
"privacy" but instead in the relationship of women to men).
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concerning pregnancy is a sex-based classification and absent a showing that
the classification is a mere pretext, the classification will stand. 220
The Ohio Supreme Court may use Ohio's equal protection clause to protect
broader abortion rights than does the federal constitution through one of two
different methods. First, the court may find that the right to abortion is a
findamental right under the Ohio Constitution and as such is subject to strict
scrutiny or the compelling state interest standard. 221 Second, the court may
hold that restrictions concerning a woman's procreative freedom create a
classification based on gender. Thus, even under federal precedent, the law
would be subject to heightened or intermediate scrutiny.
The United States Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade recognized that a
woman's right to choose an abortion is a fundamental right.222 The Court has
recently diminished the scope of the right to an abortion and has rendered it a
mere liberty interest and not a fundamental right.223 Because Ohio's
Constitution contains broader language in its liberty and equal protection
guarantees, it is logical that the Ohio Supreme Court could conclude that the
right to abortion in Ohio is a fundamental right to be accorded the strictest
judicial scrutiny. 224 This in turn would go far to ensure that women's personal
liberty and reproductive autonomy are protected.
The Ohio Supreme Court could also hold that any law regarding a
woman's reproductive choice creates a gender-based classification. The court
would then apply heightened judicial scrutiny to the law to determine its
validity. Intermediate scrutiny requires that the law promote important
government objectives and must be substantially related to achieving those
objectives.225 While promoting childbirth over abortion may be a legitimate
220 See General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417
U.S. 484 (1974).
221 Strict scrutiny requires the state-created classification to further a compelling state
interest using the least restrictive means possible. See Right to Choose v. Byrne, 450 A.2d
925 (1982). Also, see supra notes 117-39 and accompanying text for a discussion of how
the New Jersey Supreme Court has interpreted the New Jersey Constitution's equal
protection clause to protect a woman's right to choose an abortion.
222 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
223 See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
224 Other state courts have held that the right to an abortion is a fundamental right and
have applied the compelling state interest standard of judicial scrutiny to any regulation of
abortion. See supra note 105 and accompanying text (discussing In re T.W., a Minor, No.
74-143, 1989 Fla. LEXIS 1226 (Fla. Oct. 12, 1989)); supra note 197 and accompanying
text (discussing Right to Choose v. Byrne, 450 A.2d 925, (N.J. 1982)); see also Committee
to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779 (Cal. 1981).
225 See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
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governmental objective,226 the Ohio Supreme Court could readily hold that this
is not an important government objective. Thus, any abortion restriction which
seeks to promote childbirth over abortion would be unconstitutional under
intermediate scrutiny because promoting childbirth is not an important but
rather only a legitimate government interest.
Because the Ohio equal protection clause contains language broader than its
federal parallel, the Ohio Supreme Court is free to apply its own unique
interpretation. It could hold that under the Ohio Constitution, the right to an
abortion is a fundamental right and that all regulation of abortion is subject to
strict scrutiny. Further, the court has the opportunity to right what many
commentators have argued is wrong by declaring that restrictions of a woman's
right to abortion impinge on her procreative choice and thus create a gender-
based classification triggering an equal protection analysis. Equal protection
analysis may more aptly protect women's abortion rights than does Roe's due
process analysis. 227 The court would then require that the state have an
important government interest and that any classification be substantially
related to that interest before the classification will survive intermediate judicial
scrutiny. Clearly, the Ohio Supreme Court has ample opportunity to fashion a
unique Ohio constitutional interpretation of abortion rights under the equal
protection clause.
Using the third mode of analysis, a court could find that the history of
Ohio constitutional law supports the finding that the Ohio Constitution protects
broader abortion rights than does the United States Constitution. The common
pleas court in Preterm Cleveland found that since the 1896 case Palmer v.
ingle,228 the Ohio Supreme Court has recognized that "liberty" in Ohio
means more than freedom from physical restraint.229 Palmer protected the
"sanctity of the individual" and "noninterference by the government." 230 If
Ohio's law has historically respected an individual's freedom to act without
government interference, this would support the notion that Ohio law supports
a broad right to privacy.
Ohio courts have interpreted the liberty provision to contain a right of
privacy. Though an early decision protected a student's desire to dress as he
pleased, 23 1 more recent decisions limit protection to areas that are
226 See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2823-24 (1992).
227 See supra note 219.
228 45 N.E. 313 (Ohio 1896).
229 Preterm Cleveland v. Voinovich, No. 92CVH01-528, 1992 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 1,
at *10 (Franklin County C.P. May 27, 1992) (citing Palmer, 45 N.E. at 314), rev'd, No.
92AP-791, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 3770 (Ohio Ct. App. 27, 1993).23 0 1d
231 See Jacobs v. Benedict, 301 N.E.2d 723 (Ohio C.P. 1973)
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"fundamental" or "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." 232 A woman's
right to choose an abortion is a fundamental right comparable to the right to
have consensual, adult sex233 or to rear a child in the manner one sees fit.234
This right is supported widely by the history of Ohio's constitutional precedent.
Thus, an Ohio court could justifiably hold that Ohio's Constitution, because of
its history, protects a broader privacy right to abortion than does the federal
constitution.
V. CONCLUSION
The right to choose an abortion has now been protected by the United
States Constitution for twenty years. This right is inextricably linked to the
freedom and independence women need to fully participate in modem
American society. While the Supreme Court has not overturned Roe V. Wade,
recent decisions seriously undermine the effectiveness of the Roe decision in
vindicating a woman's right to choose an abortion. It may take years for pro
choice litigants to prove that some regulations actually impose an "undue
burden."
State courts have a powerful opportunity to afford more personal liberty to
women based on their state constitutions. This Note illustrates that state courts
can employ several different modes of interpretation when analyzing their state
constitutions. Through a thorough and systematic analysis of the state
constitution, many state courts may find that "adequate" and "independent"
grounds exist to deviate from recent Supreme Court holdings. State courts
should take this opportunity to champion the rights of women in their states.
Natalie Wrighte
232 Preterm Cleveland, 1992 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 1, at *12.
233 See Saunders v. Clark County Zoning Dep't, 421 N.E.2d 152, 154 (Ohio 1981).
234 See City of Columbus v. Scott, 353 N.E.2d 858 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975).
* The author would like to thank Richard Cordray and Andrew I. Sutter for their
comments and ideas. A special thank you goes to James Farley.
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